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Abstract 
The LCLS at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory will be the world’s first source of an intense hard x-ray 
laser beam, generating x-rays with wavelengths of 1nm and pulse durations less than 100fs.  The ultrafast x-ray 
pulses will be used in pump-probe experiments to take stop-motion pictures of atoms and molecules in motion, with 
pulses powerful enough to take diffraction images of single molecules, enabling scientists to elucidate fundamental 
processes of chemistry and biology.  Ultrafast conventional lasers will be used as the pump.  In 2009, LCLS will 
deliver beam to the Atomic Molecular and Optical (AMO) Experiment, located in one of 3 x-ray Hutches in the 
Near Experimental Hall (NEH).  The NEH includes a centralized Laser Hall, containing up to three Class 4 laser 
systems, three x-ray Hutches for experiments and vacuum transport tubes for delivering laser beams to the Hutches.   
The main components of the NEH laser systems are a Ti:sapphire oscillator, a regen amplifier, green pump lasers for 
the oscillator and regen, a pulse compressor and a harmonics conversion unit.  Laser safety considerations and 
controls for the ultrafast laser beams, multiple laser controlled areas, and user facility issues are discussed. 
 
 
Figure 1:   Floor plan of the NEH Laser Hall
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1.  Introduction and Facility Description 
The LCLS machine [1] uses the last third of the 2-mile 
electron linear accelerator (LINAC) at SLAC and 
includes a new injector, which uses a Class 4 laser 
system to generate a high brightness, low emittance 
electron beam from a photocathode [2].The LCLS 
Near Experiment Hall (NEH) contains a centralized 
Laser Hall, which houses up to three Class 4 laser 
systems as shown in Figure 1.  The laser beams can be 
transported from the Laser Hall through vacuum tubes 
to any of three experimental Hutches located in the 
sub-basement of the NEH.  There are 4 independent 
Laser Controlled Areas (LCAs) in the NEH for the 
Laser Hall and each Hutch.  Each LCA has an 
independent engineered Laser Safety System (LSS).  
The “treaty point” between the Laser Hall and Hutch 
LCAs is the respective transport shutter (H1, H2 or 
H3).  The transport shutter and optical transport tube to 
the Hutch are part of the Hutch LCA. 
Hutch 1 hosts the Atomic, Molecular and Optical 
(AMO) Experiment for LCLS [3].  Hutch 1 is located 
on the basement level of the NEH, directly beneath the 
Laser Hall (see Figure 2).  The main laser beam is 
transported from the Laser Hall through an evacuated 
beam tube to the Hutch 1 optical table.   
The x-ray beamline is also shown in Figure 2.  There is 
an engineered Personnel Protection System (PPS) to 
prevent personnel from accessing the Hutch when 
there is a radiation hazard from the x-ray beam.  The 
PPS operates independently of the Laser Safety System 
(LSS), but provides input to the LSS for whether the 
Hutch PPS state is OPEN ACCESS or NO ACCESS.  
During NO ACCESS, the X-ray Door is closed, locked 
and interlocked and the laser door is open; in this 
mode, the Hutch becomes a Class 1 enclosure with an 
embedded Class 4 laser. 
When the PPS is in OPEN ACCESS, there are two x-
ray stoppers upstream of the Hutch that are inserted to 
protect personnel.  The Hutch laser system can then be 
operated either as a Class 1 laser or as a Class 4 laser.  
The laser in the Hutch can be completely contained 
within a sealed, light-tight enclosure, allowing Class 1 
operation.  In Class 1 mode, the table enclosures must 
be in place and the Exit Shutter closed.  When the Exit 
Shutter is opened, the laser beam can be transported to  
the AMO experimental apparatus.  When the 
enclosures are removed or the Exit Shutter is Open, 
Hutch 1 becomes a Class 4 LCA if the laser beam is 
enabled.  In Class 4 mode, the Laser door is closed, 
locked and interlocked and the x-ray door is open. 
The LCLS Near Experimental Hall with 3 
experimental Hutches is a user facility to support 
researchers from SLAC, the university community and 
other institutions.  The facility is planned to operate for 
up to 10 months per year with beams available for 
experiments 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.  Only 
some of the experimenters that will access the Hutches 
will become qualified laser personnel and they may 
need relatively frequent access to their experimental 
equipment.  These features of the facility, together  
with multiple laser controlled areas connected by laser 
beam transport tubes, provide special challenges for 
the laser safety system and policies.  Laser safety for 
the NEH is described in the subsequent sections on 
Hazards Description, Personnel and Training, 
Engineering Controls, Administrative Controls and 
Procedures, and  Protective Eyewear [4]. 
 




2.  Hazards Description  
2.1  Laser Hall 
2.1.1  Laser hazards.  The Laser Hall will initially have 
two identical laser systems. The main components of 
each system are: i) a Ti:sapphire oscillator: 
FemtoLaser Synergy 20, ii) the oscillator pump laser: 
Spectra-Physics Millennia V, iii) a regen amplifier: 
Coherent Legend USP-HE, and iv) the regen pump 
laser: Coherent Evolution 30. 
The system employs the chirp pulse amplification 
(CPA) approach and contains pulse stretcher and pulse 
compressor that change the pulse duration according to 
the system components requirements and the output 
radiation specifications. The repetition rate is changed 
by Pockels cells and polarizers, which gate single 
pulses. A Dazzler (acousto-optic programmable 
dispersive filter) is used for pulse shaping.  A Class 3R 
He-Ne alignment laser is also used.  Laser hazard 
parameters are summarized in Table 1. 
2.1.2  Electrical hazards.  The laser system is diode 
pumped (it does not contain flash lamps), and therefore 
there are no high voltage laser power supplies.  A low 
current 5 kV hazard can be found inside the Pockels’ 
cell high voltage power supply and housing.   
2.1.3  Toxic materials.  Small quantities of methanol 
and acetone for optics cleaning are present. 
2.1.4  Other hazards.  Several other hazards are present 
in the Laser Hall.  Vacuum optical transport tubes are 
used to propagate the laser beam to the Hutches.  A 
nitrogen purge line is available to connect to the 
vacuum tubes when they are serviced.
 






























mW  20 fs  7.5 nJ  69 MHz  2 mm  1.6e‐3  2.9  4 
After regen 
amplifier 800  5 W  200 ps  5 J  m 1   kHz 1.5 mm  7.9e‐5  5.2  4 
Oscillator 
Pump Laser  532  5.0 W  CW  ‐‐  CW  2  .5 mm 2.6e‐3  3.7  4 
Pump Laser 
(Evolution) 527  20 W  250 ns  20 mJ  1   kHz 3 mm  1.3e‐4  5.6  4 
He-Ne 
Laser 633  2mW  CW  ‐‐  CW  2 mm  2.6e‐3  ‐  3R 
 
2.2  Hutch 1 
2.2.1  Laser hazards.  The main components of the 
Hutch 1 laser system are: i) the uncompressed laser 
transported from the Laser Hall, ii) a pulse 
compressor, and iii) a harmonics conversion unit. 
Uncompressed laser pulses are transported from the 
Laser Hall to Hutch 1 through a light tight, evacuated 
beam tube.  The pulse duration is compressed in the 
pulse compressor according to the system component 
requirements and the output radiation specifications. 
The repetition rate is changed by the Pockels cells 
and polarizers located in the Laser Hall.  In addition, 
a Class 3R He-Ne alignment laser is used.  Laser 
hazard parameters are summarized in Table 2. 
2.2.2  Electrical hazards.  No high voltage hazards 
due to the laser system exist in the Hutches. 
2.2.3  Toxic materials.  Small quantities of methanol 
and acetone used for optics cleaning are present.   
2.2.4   Other hazards.  There are other hazards in the 
Hutch associated with the x-ray beamline and 
associated instruments.  Radiation hazards are 
controlled by shielding, engineered safety control 
systems and administrative procedures.  Other 
hazards include electrical, vacuum and pressure, and 
cryogenics.  A complete description of these is 
beyond the scope of the laser safety discussion in this 
paper.  SLAC’s safety analysis and controls for these 
































Compressor 800  5 W  200ps  5 mJ  1 kHz  1  .5 mm 7.9e‐5  5.2  4 
After 
compressor 800  3.5 W  35 fs  3.5 mJ  1 kHz  7 mm  8.3e‐6  6.0  4 
After SHG 400  0.18 W  50 fs  1.5 mJ  120 Hz  10 mm  9.0e‐7  5.7  4 




633  2 mW  CW    CW    2.6e‐3  0  3R 
 
3.  Personnel and Training 
3.1  Laser Safety Officer (LSO).  SLAC’s LSO may 
enter the Laser Hall or a Hutch to perform safety 
inspections and to observe work under Laser On 
conditions, as well as Laser Off conditions. The LSO 
must be accompanied by a Qualified Laser Operator at 
all times and have approval from the System Laser 
Safety Officer during Laser On conditions. 
3.2  System Laser Safety Officer (SLSO).    An SLSO 
is assigned for each LCA by the program manager for 
that LCA and must be approved by the LSO.  The 
SLSO is responsible for the LCA’s Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs), for safe operations of the LCA on 
a daily basis, for site-specific and on-the-job training 
(OJT) given to Qualified Laser Operators, and for 
maintaining safety documentation for the LCA. The 
SLSO is also responsible for issuing RFIDs (radio 
frequency identification cards) to laser operators, 
which give them access to LCAs and laser operations 
for which they are approved.  RFIDs are encoded with 
training and authorization information for each laser 
operator. 
3.3  Qualified Laser Operators (QLOs).  A QLO 
receives general and site-specific laser safety training, 
and is authorized to perform task-specific work on 
various laser system components.  QLOs are issued an 
RFID, which is required for entry to the LCA and for 
controlling laser operations with the LCA’s Master 
Control Panel.  
3.4  Service Subcontractors.  A laser service 
subcontractor may need to be in the Laser Hall or a 
Hutch to perform maintenance or service. These 
personnel must always be escorted by a QLO and 
abide by the same safety procedures as QLOs.  Their 
employer provides their laser safety training and SLAC 
is only responsible for providing site-specific safety 
training. The requestor and service subcontractor 
jointly prepare a written procedure and safety plan for 
the work to be done, which must be reviewed and 
approved.  SLAC’s Purchasing department coordinates 
the documentation governing the service visit and 
notifies the LSO of the service requisition.  A pre-job 
briefing is held with the requisitioner, the service 
subcontractor and the LSO (or their designee) to 
review the work to be done and compliance with 
SLAC’s safety policies.  The SLSO maintains a record 
of the visit with the LCA’s safety documentation. 
3.5  Visitors.  Visitors are those individuals who have 
not met the requirements for the other personnel 
classifications.  Normally visitors are not permitted 
during Class 4 operations, and would only be permitted 
in the Laser Hall or a Hutch when the Class 4 laser 
systems are disabled by removing a Master Key for the 
respective LCA.  When the laser is running in Class 4 
mode, visitors are allowed in the Laser Hall or a Hutch 
only under the following conditions: 
 The visitor must be escorted at all times by a 
QLO who ensures the visitor is wearing the 
proper protective eyewear. 
 Prior to entry by the visitor, the QLO must 
check the LCA to make sure the laser system 
is in and will stay in a state of minimal hazard 
during the visit. No laser alignment work is 
allowed during such visits. 
 Visitors may only observe, and are not 
allowed to operate or manipulate the laser 
beams. 
 All visitors must be 18 years or older; the 
maximum number of visitors is 6 persons. 
4. Engineering Controls 
4.1 Laser Safety System (LSS).  Each of the 
Laser Hall and three experimental Hutches has an 
independent engineered LSS.  Key components of each 
LSS are: 
 LSS Enable Controller and Master Control 
Panel (MCP), utilizing a programmable logic 
controller (PLC). 
 Entryway controls and interlocks 
 Laser enclosure interlocks 
 Laser safety shutters 
 Key control and RFIDs 
 Permissives to commercial laser remote 
interlocks 
 Emergency Off buttons 
 Laser hazard displays   
 Activation warning system and audible alarms 
The Master Control Panel (MCP) and an associated 
LSS Enable Controller are used to enable Class 4 
operation, set operation modes, control laser safety 
shutters, and display laser hazard information on its 
control screen and local display signs. The PLC used 
by the MCP is a commercial DirectLogic 205 with 
DL260 CPU and an EPICS interface. In the Laser Hall, 
both the LSS Enable Controller and the MCP are 
located inside the Laser Hall.  For Hutch 1, the MCP is 
located inside the Hutch while the Enable Controller is 
located outside the Hutch.  An LSS Enable Key is 
required to be captured in the LSS Enable Controller to 
enable operations with the MCP.  A QLO must also 
badge-in to the MCP with their RFID to access control 
of the MCP.  The RFIDs use a commercial Radio Key 
RK-65KS system. The MCP will timeout and require 
another badge-in for further control of the LSS after 30 
seconds of inactivity. 
The MCP monitors interlock inputs from doors, 
enclosures and Emergency Off buttons. When the 
interlock requirements are satisfied for the operation 
mode selected, the MCP enables operation of the laser 
safety shutters and commercial lasers.  The MCP has a 
touch panel with select buttons that allow control of 
the enabled shutters.  All interlocks are latching and 
must be reset manually at the MCP after a failure.  The 
MCP also checks for faults in the status of laser safety 
shutters; i.e. if a shutter state is found to be 
inconsistent with the requested state.  If a fault is 
detected, the MCP will put the laser system into a safe 
state (by inserting an upstream laser safety shutter or 
disabling a laser remote interlock) and/or alert the 
personnel present.  QLOs receive training to inform the 
SLSO and LSO of the occurrence of any laser safety 
shutter faults.  Tables 3 and 4 give a summary of 
actions taken by the LSS for different interlock 
conditions. 
The MCP display panel shows the operating mode 
selected, and the status of the interlocks and laser 
safety shutters.    The MCP also displays laser hazard 
information on its display panel and on the hazard 
warning displays (locations are shown in Figures 1 and 
2) indicating the status of the laser system.  The 
wavelength defines the protective eyewear required.  
Remote monitoring of the status of the laser safety 
system is done with EPICS.  EPICS is also used for 
password-protected remote operation of the Hutch 1 
LSS components in the PPS NO ACCESS state, which 
is described below. 
4.1.1 Laser Hall Operation Modes.  There are three 
modes:  
i. Normal Operation:  800nm infrared (IR) Class 
4 laser beams are enabled, and can be 
transported to any or all of the Hutches 
through the optical transport tubes, depending 
on the LSS for each Hutch.  The green (527 
and 532nm) lasers have enclosures permitting 
Class 1 operation for them.  These enclosures 
are interlocked to their respective laser 
systems and must be closed. 
ii. Green Operation:  IR and green Class 4 laser 
beams are enabled, and can be transported to 
any or all of the Hutches through the optical 
transport tubes, depending on the LSS for 
each Hutch.   
iii. Laser Off:  this is the operation mode when 
the LSS Enable Key is removed.  Permissives 
to commercial laser remote interlocks are 
disabled, and the two laser safety shutters are 
closed and disabled.       
4.1.2 Hutch 1 Operation Modes.  The operation 
mode is partially dictated by the x-ray PPS state.  In all 
cases when the PPS state is NO ACCESS, the Hutch 
becomes a Class 1 laser enclosure with an embedded 
Class 4 laser.  In the NO ACCESS state, the H1 
Transport Shutter is enabled and automatically opens; 
control of the two laser safety shutters in this mode is 
done remotely with password-protected EPICS 
commands.   When the PPS state is OPEN ACCESS, 
the MCP can select one of three Operation Modes: 
i. Class 1 Operation:  The laser is treated as a 
Class 1 embedded laser system.  The laser 
table enclosures must be closed with their 
interlocks satisfied.  The Exit Shutter is closed 
and disabled.  The X-ray and Laser Doors are 
open.  If these conditions are satisfied, the H1 
Transport Shutter is enabled and may be 
opened.   
ii. Class 4 Operation:  IR (800 nm), blue (400 
nm), and UV (266 nm) Class 4 radiation may 
be present in the Hutch.  The Laser Door must 
be closed and locked, with its interlocks 
satisfied.  The X-ray Door is open.  The laser 
table enclosures may be removed.  Both the 
Transport Shutter and the Exit Shutter are 
enabled and may be opened.   
iii. Laser Off:  The Transport and Exit Shutters 
are both closed and disabled.   
4.1.3 Laser Safety Shutters.  Laser safety shutters 
block laser light from reaching unprotected personnel. 
These are SLAC-built shutters, using a commercial 
Electro-Optical Laser Safety Shutter SH-10-M-L, that 
are designed to fail in the closed position and have 
both IN and OUT photo-interrupter sensors for 
position read-back.  The shutter is a 2 mm thick macor 
blade with an opaque backing to prevent diffuse 
transmission.  Macor is a white ceramic with excellent 
mechanical and thermal properties for use as a high 
power laser shutter.  An inconsistent state of the IN 
and OUT sensors is shown as a fault on the MCP.  The 
shutters are closed when they are disabled.  Both 
audible and visual activation alarms will sound for 15 
seconds before the shutters are opened. Laser safety 
shutter locations are shown in Figures 1 and 2.       
SLAC’s laser safety policy requires that laser safety 
shutters be redundant when they have the potential to 
be used as an energy isolation device that stops a Class 
4 laser beam from going into an uncontrolled area 
where there may be non-QLOs present.  Redundancy is 
not required for the Oscillator and Amplifier Shutters 
in the Laser Hall, but is required for the Transport and 
Exit Shutters that are part of the Hutch 1 LSS.  In 
practice, all four of these laser safety shutters are 
implemented as dual shutter systems.  A dual shutter 
has 2 redundant macor shutter blades in series with 
independent IN and OUT sensors; it uses common 
control signals for these 2 macor blades. 
The Laser Hall has two laser safety shutters.  The 
Oscillator Shutter blocks the output of the oscillator, 
and the Amplifier Shutter blocks the output of the 
regen amplifier. 
Hutch 1 also has two laser safety shutters.  The 
Transport Shutter is located in the Laser Hall and 
permits an incoming laser beam to the Hutch when 
open.  The Exit Shutter is located between the Hutch 
laser tables and the AMO experiment, and permits a 
laser beam to be incident on an AMO sample when 
open.   
4.1.4 Entryway Controls.  The Laser Hall has a double-
door entry with a small entry room between the outer 
and inner doors (see Figure 1).  Protective eyewear is 
stored in the entry room and is put on prior to entering 
the Laser Hall.  The outer door is locked (from the 
outside only) but not interlocked, while the inner door 
is interlocked but not locked.  The outer door is 
secured at all times by an electric strike plate (a Von 
Duprin 5100 Electric Strike).  Access is granted to 
QLOs by verifying their identification with an RFID 
reader.  The inner door is interlocked and a 15-second 
timed bypass must be activated to allow entry and 
egress without tripping the interlocks.  An audible 
alarm sounds during this 15-second bypass to alert 
personnel of someone entering or exiting the Laser 
Hall. 
The Hutch has two entry doors as shown in Figure 2: 
an outer sliding X-ray PPS door and an inner sliding 
laser door. The X-ray door is always closed during the 
NO ACCESS state and is open when the PPS state is 
OPEN ACCESS.  It is not incorporated or interlocked 
to the LSS.  The laser door is closed only during Class 
4 operation mode in OPEN ACCESS.  It is a normal 
hinged door, locked from the outside only, and 
mounted in a sliding frame.  A commercial 
ChaseDoors Saino Fire Door will be used for this.  A 
mechanical lock, only accessed from inside of the 
Hutch, secures the sliding panel.  Personnel access 
during Class 4 operation is through the hinged door, 
which is secured by an electronic strike plate (a 
commercial HES 1006 Electric Strike).   Access is 
granted to QLOs by verifying their identification with 
an RFID reader.  Both the sliding panel and the hinged 
door are interlocked.  There is no entry bypass, so each 
entry or exit will cause the LSS to insert both the 
Transport and Exit Shutters and put the laser system 
into the Laser Off state.  Protective eyewear is stored 
inside the Hutch. 
The Laser Hall and Hutches each have Major 
Equipment Access doors to allow large equipment 
installations. These doors are interlocked.  They are 
also secured so they can only be opened from inside 
the Laser Hall or Hutch. In the Laser Hall, opening this 
door will insert the Oscillator and Amplifier Shutters 
and remove the permissive to the laser remote 
interlocks.  In the Hutch, opening this door will insert 
the Transport and Exit Shutters. 
4.1.5  Emergency Off buttons.  Locations for these 
Crash buttons are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  Pushing a 
Crash button in the Laser Hall will close the Oscillator 
and Amplifier Shutters and de-energize the laser racks 
and laser power supplies.  Pushing a Crash button in 
the Hutch will insert the Transport and Exit Shutters. 
4.1.6  Status display signs.  Display signs controlled by 
the LSS indicate the operating mode in the Laser Hall 
and Hutch.  Their locations are shown in Figures 1 and 
2.  The signs are commercial BetaBrite Electronic 
Message Displays. 
In the Laser Hall, LASER OFF is displayed in green 
when the LSS Enable Key is removed.  LASER 
IMMINENT is displayed in yellow during Normal 
operation mode when both LSS shutters are closed.  
LASER ON is displayed in flashing red during 
NORMAL operation mode when one of the LSS 
shutters is open.  LASER IMMINENT GREEN 
GLASSES REQUIRED is displayed in yellow during 
Green operation mode when both LSS shutters are 
closed.  Lastly, LASER ON GREEN GLASSES 
REQUIRED is displayed in flashing red during Green 
operation mode when one of the LSS shutters is open.  
In the Hutch during the NO ACCESS PPS state, the 
signs display LASER ON CLASS 1 in green. In OPEN 
ACCESS, there are three possible displays:  when the 
LSS Enable Key is removed or the operation mode is 
Laser Off, LASER OFF is displayed in green; when 
the LSS Enable Key is activated and the operation 
mode is Class 1, LASER ON CLASS 1 is displayed in 
green; and when the LSS Enable Key is activated and 
the operation mode is Class 4, LASER ON CLASS 4 is 
displayed in flashing red.   
4.2  Beam barriers, enclosures and termination.  
Both the Laser Hall and Hutch are light tight.   In the 
Laser Hall, there are barriers around all optical tables; 
they are not light tight but they aid reducing stray light 
from leaving the table areas.  In the Hutch, the optical 
tables all have interlocked enclosure covers to permit 
Class 1 operation.  All beams, including any stray 
beams and reflections, are terminated either by beam 
dumps or by diagnostics equipment.  
In the Laser Hall, the configuration of the pump lasers 
and their beam paths are seldom changed and do not 
require frequent access.  Both the oscillator and 
amplifier enclosures completely contain their 
respective pump lasers and the green light when they 
are in place.  The enclosures are interlocked to their 
respective laser systems and must be closed during 
Normal Operation.  When the enclosures are removed, 
green laser hazards may be present.  In this case, a 
QLO must change the Laser Hall MCP to GREEN 
MODE and special protective eyewear (Green Glasses) 
is worn. 
 
Table 3: Laser Hall LSS Interlock Logic 
Interlock Condition Operation Mode Action Recovery 
Inner door open without 
bypass  Normal Operation 
Close shutters Close doors, reset MCP interlock 
fault; then open shutters 




Close shutters, open 
pump laser interlocks 
Close doors, reset MCP interlock 
fault; restart:  turn on Pump laser, 
in about 10 minutes open shutters 
Inner door open during 
bypass period Any mode No action 
None 
Outer entry door open Any mode No action None 
Laser Hall Emergency Stop 
activated Any mode 
Close shutters, de-
energize laser racks 
Remove LSS Enable key and re-
insert; restart 
LSS Enable Key removed Any mode Close shutters, open pump laser interlocks 
Insert key; restart 
 
Major Equipment Door 
Open Any mode 
Close shutters, open 
pump laser interlocks 
Close door, Remove LSS Enable 
Key and re-insert; restart 
Shutter readback shows 
inconsistent state Any mode 
Close shutters, open 
pump laser interlocks 
Correct shutter fault; reset MCP 
interlock fault.  Inform SLSO and 
LSO prior to restart 
 
 
Table 4: Hutch LSS interlock logic for OPEN ACCESS PPS state 
Interlock Condition Operation Mode Action Recovery 
Laser Door Open Class 1 Operation No action None 
Laser Door Open Class 4 Operation Close shutters and set Laser Off mode 
Close Door, set Class 4 
Operation Mode; then 
open Shutters 
Major Equipment Door 
Open Any 
Close shutters and set 
Laser Off mode 
Close Door, set Class 4 
Operation Mode; then 
open Shutters 
Entry Badge-In from 
Outside Hutch Class 4 Operation 
Close shutters and set 
Laser Off mode 
Close Door, set Class 4 
Operation Mode; then 
open Shutters 
Hutch 1 Emergency Stop 
activated Any mode 
Close shutters and set 
Laser Off mode 
Set Class 4 Operation 
Mode; then open Shutters 
LSS Enable key removed Any mode Close shutters and set Laser Off mode 
Insert key, enter Hutch, 
close Door, set Class 4 
Operation Mode; then 
open Shutters 
Laser Enclosures Open Class 1 Operation Close shutters and set Laser Off mode 
Set enclosures as required, 
set Operation Mode; then 
open Shutters 
Laser Enclosures Open Class 4 Operation No action None 
Inconsistent Shutter Read-
back state Any Mode 
Close shutters and set 
Laser Off mode 
Correct shutter fault.  
Inform SLSO and LSO 
prior to restart 
 
5.   Administrative Controls and Procedures   
The SLSO for each of the Laser Hall and Hutch 1 
LCAs is required to produce a Standard Operating 
Procedures document, which is approved by the LSO 
and the LCA facility program manager.  A separate 
authorization form is used to approve operation of the 
facility for a period of 1-year, which requires 
successful completion of three items:  an approved 
SOP, a test and certification of the LSS, and an LCA 
facility audit by the LSO.  The SOP document 
describes the laser facility, the laser and non-beam 
hazards, the LSS and other engineering controls, 
administrative controls and procedures, protection 
eyewear, and personnel training.  LSS certification 
tests and LSO audits are performed annually.  The LSS 
certification includes testing the interlock logic 
summarized in Tables 3 and 4. 
5.1  Laser Hall Normal Operations.  The Laser Hall 
is engineered to be a production facility, providing up 
to 10 months of 24/7 continuous laser operations to 
enable experiments by different users in the three 
experimental Hutches.  The laser beamline 
configurations will be relatively stable.  Normal 
operations also include setting up new beamlines and 
alignment.  Appropriate protective eyewear is required 
whenever the LSS Enable Key is used to enable the 
MCP as described in Section 6.  QLOs only work on 
parts of the laser system for which they have received 
OJT and authorization from the SLSO and laser 
facility program manager.  The SLSO and facility 
manager must be informed of any new beam paths 
created.  Checks for stray beams are performed when 
alignment is done or when new beam paths are created. 
When Green Operation mode is required, the following 
procedure is used: 
i. Close the 2 laser safety shutters.  Set the MCP 
to Green operation mode.  Go to the 
Controlled Entry area and replace the Normal 
Operation safety glasses with the Green 
glasses (see Section 6 for descriptions of 
normal and green glasses).  Ensure that 
everyone in the room wears Green glasses. 
ii. Remove the necessary covers and enclosures.  
Bypass cover or enclosure interlocks if 
needed. 
iii. Open the shutters as needed. 
iv. Perform necessary alignment work. 
v. After the alignment is completed, close the 
shutters. 
vi. Put back the covers and enclosures.  Secure 
them and restore interlocks as needed. 
vii. Restore Normal Operation mode and switch 
to Normal glasses:  Change the laser status on 
the MCP.  Go to the Controlled Entry area 
and replace the Green glasses by the Normal 
Operation ones.  Ensure that everyone in the 
room wears Normal glasses. 
5.2  Hutch 1 Operations in OPEN ACCESS PPS 
state.  The Hutches are also engineered to be 
production facilities, but they are user facilities 
supporting a wide range of users from SLAC, 
universities and other institutions.  Many users of the 
Hutch will not be laser personnel, while some will 
become QLOs with limited privileges for working on 
the laser system as determined by the SLSO.  To the 
extent possible, the Hutch will operate in Class 1 mode 
with the Class 4 laser beams fully enclosed.  The LSS 
Enable Key must enable the MCP for both Class 1 and 
Class 4 operation in OPEN ACCESS; it is located 
outside the Hutch at a separate control panel.   
For Class 4 operations in the Hutch, the following 
procedures are followed: 
i. Secure the room and prepare for Class 4 
operation.  The major equipment access must 
be closed and locked, and the PPS x-ray door 
must be open.  The laser door sliding panel 
must be closed and secured, and the hinged 
laser door closed.  All personnel present must 
put on appropriate protective eyewear as 
described in Section 6.   
ii. MCP operations for the LSS.  A QLO must 
badge in using their RFID to access control of 
the MCP.  The Interlock Reset button on the 
MCP can be pressed to correct any interlock 
fault.  The Class 4 Operation mode on the 
MCP can then be selected and the shutters can 
be opened as required.  A 15-second audible 
and visible alarm will sound to warn 
personnel in the Hutch that laser shutters are 
about to open.  The shutters open at the end of 
the alarm. 
iii. Perform necessary laser work.  The 
interlocked table enclosures can be removed 
as needed for the work.  If further control 
with the MCP is needed, a QLO will need to 
badge in again.  If an LSS interlock trips 
during the work, corrective actions as 
described in Table 4 can be taken. 
iv. Restore Hutch for Class 1 operation.  Any 
enclosures that were removed must be 
replaced.  The QLO badges into the MCP and 
puts the LSS into Class 1 mode.  Personnel 
present may then remove their protective 
eyewear. 
5.3  Maintenance, Service or Repair.  Generally 
this refers to work performed on a commercial laser 
system or work with a service access panel enclosure 
removed.  The list of QLOs eligible to perform this 
work is approved by the SLSO.  When work is to be 
done by service subcontractors from a commercial 
laser company, their work must comply with SLAC’s 
requirements for work by service subcontractors.  This 
includes:  a project manager (usually the requisitioner 
for the work) is assigned; the LSO or their designee 
provides safety oversight; a buyer administers the  
contractual arrangements; the project manager 
provides documentation for the procedure and 
protective eyewear to be used with a safety analysis for 
both laser hazards and non-beam hazards; site-specific 
training is provided for the service subcontractor 
personnel; and a pre-job briefing meeting is held that 
includes the project manager, the service subcontractor 
personnel, and the LSO or their designee.  Other 
requirements for service subcontractor personnel are 
described in Section 3.4.  The SLSO maintains 
documentation records for service subcontractor work. 
When servicing electrical equipment, the equipment 
must be locked off and tagged according to SLAC lock 
and tag (LOTO) procedure.   
When performing work on equipment associated with 
the laser beam path (for example, replacing damaged 
optics or aligning the beam), the LSS and procedures 
described in the facility SOP generally provide 
effective protection without the need for LOTO.  
Special procedures not covered in the SOP may require 
LOTO, and the LSO is consulted for these as needed. 
6.  Protective Eyewear  
Full protection eyewear is normally required at SLAC 
for all laser operations whenever a Class 4 laser is 
enabled.  However, certain procedures that have been 
reviewed, documented and approved by the LSO 
permit alignment eyewear at reduced optical density 
(OD).  The documentation requires a technical note 
approved by the LSO that provides a schematic, an 
alignment procedure, a justification for why reduced 
OD eyewear is required, and a calculation for the OD 
to be used for the alignment eyewear.  The minimum 
OD for alignment eyewear must provide protection for 
diffuse reflections at 0.5-meter viewing distance.  
Alignment eyewear is only permitted for visible 
wavelengths, though this can extend beyond the ANSI 
definition of 700nm to include 800nm. 
In the Laser Hall, full protection eyewear is required 
with OD as specified in Table 1 whenever the LSS 
Enable Key is used to enable the MCP.  For Normal 
Operation mode, there are no green laser hazards 
present and eyewear protection is only required for the 
800nm laser hazard.  The full protection eyewear 
chosen for Normal Operation (Normal Glasses) is 
Glendale Filter 300, which has an OD7 rating for 780-
830 nm and an EN207 rating for short pulses of M L5;   
its visual light transmission (VLT) is 45%.  In Green 
Operation mode, eyewear protection for both IR and 
green laser hazards is required.    The full protection 
eyewear chosen for Green Operation (Green Glasses) 
is Glendale Filter 123, which has an OD6 rating at 
800nm, OD9 rating at 190-532nm and an EN207 rating 
for short pulses of I,R,M L5 for 532nm; its VLT is 
14%. Alignment eyewear at reduced OD is permitted 
only for special alignment procedures, which are being 
developed, and will be specified separately.   
In Hutch 1, full protection eyewear is required as 
specified in Table 2 whenever the laser system is in 
Class 4 operation mode during the OPEN ACCESS 
PPS state.  The full protection eyewear chosen when 
no harmonics are present (800nm Glasses) is Glendale 
Filter 300, whose specifications are noted above.  
When harmonics may be present, then Harmonics 
Glasses are used for which Glendale Filter 123 
(specifications given above) is chosen.  Currently, no 
alignment eyewear procedures are planned for Hutch 
operations.   
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